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Roper

So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!

Thomas More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road
through the law to get after the Devil?
Roper.

I'd cut down every law in England to do that!

Thomas More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the
Devil turned round on you--where would you
hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?... [I]f you
cut them down... d'you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for

my own safety's sake.'
The devil we chase today has a slightly different face from Thomas More's devil. In the last decade, Americans have become increasingly aware of the devil wearing the face of "religion." This devil
was perhaps most keenly introduced to the American public in the
form of the standoff between federal agents and the self-proclaimed
"Son of God," David Koresh, at Waco, Texas in 1993.2 Concurrently,
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ROBErr BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (1962).
2 SeJanet Reno, Koresh Chose Death, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 1995,
at IlA (detailing
events of the standoff between Koresh and government officials).
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violence by members of the "religious right" against reproductive
rights advocates and providers," and the bombing of the World
Trade Center by radical Islamic fundamentalists," have shown Americans that the threat of terrorism in the name of religion is no longer
limited to distant lands.
The temptation is enormous to "cut down the laws,"' even those
laws that have long held a sacred place in our jurisprudence, in order to get at this devil. The undeniable problems involved in prosecuting domestic and international terrorists increase this temptation.
Laws already exist under which most terrorist action can be effectively
prosecuted Prosecuting terroristic speech,' however, presents a different and far more constitutionally complex problem. Terroristic
speech is, at its heart, political speech-speech aimed at bringing
down the governing authority in favor of a new, and supposedly different, regime." Political speech is exactly what the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause was designed to protect.0 Therefore,
some of the most powerful and feared leaders of radical, violent

SSee

Karen Dorn Steele, Planned Parenthood Workers Frightened but Committed,

SPOKESMAN REv.,July 18, 1996, at Al. Steele's article discusses the escalation of vio-

lence directed at abortion clinics and states that, since 1982, 176 bombings and arson incidents at abortion clinics have occurred nationwide. See id. The first murder
of an abortion provider occurred in 1994 when Paul Hill killed a doctor and a clinic
escort in Florida. See id.
4 See Eleanor Randolph, Trade Center Bombers
Given 240 Years Each, WASH. PoST,
May 25, 1994, at Al.
BOLT, supranote 1, at 66.
For example, a terrorist who is convicted of willful destruction of an aircraft
that results in death shall be subject to the death penalty or life imprisonment See
18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 34 (1984).
7 The term terroristic speech is difficult to define with precision. Indeed,
great
debate surrounds the definition of terrorism itself and many authors simply formulate their own interpretations. For purposes here, I will follow the example of Brent
L. Smith and adopt the FBI's definition of terrorism: "The unlawful use of force or
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals."
BRrN L. SMrrH, TERRORISM IN AMERICA: PIPE BOMBS AND PiPE DREAMs 6 (1994)
(citing FBI TERROISr RESEARCH AND ANALyncAL CENTER, TERRORISM IN THE UNrTD
STATES: 1990 (1991)).
a But see Note, Blown Away: The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109
HARv. L.
REv. 2074, 2081 (1996) (arguing that only certain terroristic speech should be considered political speech).
9 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
10See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 22223 (1989) (explaining that political speech is "at the core... of the First Amendment freedoms") (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
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groups can be difficult to stop when their role is limited to verbal
encouragement of their followers.
Although the problem of verbal incitement is difficult enough
when only secular concerns are involved, it becomes magnified when
the speaker is a religious leader. When terroristic speech is also religious speech-as is often the case with violent anti-ohoice speech,"
and was certainly the case in the recent prosecution of Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman' 2 --further constitutional concerns are implicated.'
Given the dual protection afforded to religious speech by the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, one must ask whether the current
level of protection given to religious speech by the Supreme Court is
appropriate. If not, what level of protection should religious speech
be granted? Should this protection be granted to all religious
speech, or only to certain types of religious speech? Should this protection be greater than that given to secular speech?
This Article addresses these questions. Part I discusses the history of laws regulating or infringing upon the free exercise of religion and focuses on those laws that affect religious speech. Part II examines prohibitions on secular speech that arguably affect terroristic
speech, including laws prohibiting the advocacy of illegal conduct,
"hate speech" laws, and anti-threat laws. Part III analyzes the particular problem of applying current First Amendment tests to terroristic
religious speech by examining the case of Sheik Rahman. Finally,
Part 1V proposes an alternative test applicable to cases involving religious speech, including terroristic religious speech.

" For example, defrocked Roman Catholic Priest David Trosch "signed the Defensive Action petition advocating the justifiable homicide of abortion providers."
Forida Slayings Pro-Life Viwlence: Trosch Says Any Means Necessary, ABORTION REP.
(American Political Network), Aug. 24, 1994, at 12. Trosch stated that unborn fetuses *must be defended by any means necessary... including the death of assailants, which in this case would be the abortionists and their direct accomplices." Id.
itSee United States v. Rahman, No. S393Cr.181, 1994 WL 388927, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1994) (summarizing the indictment of Rahman). The indictment charges that Rahman and others conspired to wage a war of "urban terrorism
against the United States," conspired to bomb buildings, and counseled or commanded others to do the same. See id. There are more than 20 opinions from the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dealing with this
trial that are reported on WESTLAW. Ajury convicted Rahman and nine others of
seditious conspiracy and other charges on October 1, 1995. See also infranotes 146153 and accompanying text.
13 The First Amendment also prohibits Congress from making a law abridging
the free exercise of religion. See U.S. CONsr. amend. I.

TERRORISTIC RELIGIOUS SPEECH

1998]
I.

1233

FREE EXERCISE AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that
Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 14 The precise contours of this clause were not explored until
approximately ninety years after the passage of the First Amendment. In 1878, the Supreme Court faced its first significant claim
under the Free Exercise Clause in the case of Reynolds v. United
States.'5 In Reynolds, the petitioner, a Mormon, challenged a state law
forbidding polygamy.' The petitioner claimed that his religion required him to have more than one wife.' 7 The Court rejected his
free exercise claim, holding that while religious belief is absolutely
protected, religious conduct may be regulated.'
The Court explained that so long as the petitioner's religious belief in polygamy
was not forbidden by the statute, the government was free to regulate
his conduct, even if that conduct was religiously motivated.'9
Thus, the Court drew a distinction between belief and conduct.
This dichotomy gave the Court only two choices when faced with
subsequent free exercise challenges: (1) absolute protection for the
religious claim, or (2) no protection at all. Although the Court, for a
relatively short period of time, seemed to find some flexibility in this
test,2 the restrictive dichotomy still forms the basis of the Court's
free exercise jurisprudence."
A.

Treatment of Religious Belief

The absolute protection afforded religious belief has never been
seriously challenged by government legislation or in the courts. Neither the federal government nor the states have attempted to interfere with the purely mental processes of religious beliefs. States
have, on rare occasions, attempted to coerce someone to profess a
religious belief that he did not hold.2 These attempts have failed,
1'

Seeid.
15 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See id. at 161.
SSee id.
is See id. at 166.
1

19

See id,

20

See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
For discussion of the Supreme Court's adherence to this dichotomy, see

2,

Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigmin the Supreme Court's Free ExerciseJuspriuence: A TheologicalAccount of the Failureto Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIo ST.

LJ. 713 (1993).
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (overturning conviction
of Jehovah's Witness who refused to display "Live Free or Die* on license plate);
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although not on free exercise grounds. For example, two of the four
cases most frequently associated with attempts to force religious
speech, West Virginia State Board of Education v. BarnetteP and Wooley v.
Maynard,24were decided on free speech grounds. The Barnette Court
ruled that a school could not force a child to salute the flag because
such coercion would amount to requiring the student to profess a
belief in something that the student did not believe.2 Similarly, in
Wooley the Court held that the state could not compel a citizen to
display the message "Live Free or Die" because the citizen did not
agree with the sentiment." Although in both cases the objection to
the speech was religiously based, the Court ignored the religious nature of the beliefs, concentrating instead on the free speech aspects
of the case.
B.

Treatment of Religious Conduct

The privileged position given to religious belief has not prevented the government from regulating religious conduct. The view
that religious conduct can be regulated freely by the state prevailed
for almost ninety years after Reynolds. During that time, the Free Exercise Clause held almost no sway with the Court, although religious
practices were sometimes protected under the Free Speech or Free
Assembly Clauses.Y
1. Limited Protection for Religious Conduct
Beginning in the 1960s, however, the Court began gradually to
move past a strict reading of Reynolds, while still maintaining the Reynolds dichotomy. While continuing to afford absolute protection to
religious beliefs, the Court also began to afford a limited protection
to religious conduct. In Sherbert v. Verne, the Court recognized that
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) (invalidating statute requiring political candidates to declare a belief in God); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
88 (1944) (invalidatingjury instruction requiring jurors to determine validity of defendants' religious beliefs); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (invalidating statute, challenged byJehovah's Wimesses, requiring
mandatory flag salutes). In each of these cases, states sought to punish religious
dissenters for their refusal to speak on religious subjects. The Supreme Court,
however, has never addressed a case involving a state's efforts to censor the content
of religious speech.
3 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
See Barette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
See WooLey, 480 U.S at 707, 717.
See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
" 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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religious practices must sometimes be accommodated under the
Free Exercise Clause. The Court formulated a compelling state interest test to apply to Free Exercise cases. In Sherbert the petitioner
was fired from her job because she refused to work on Saturday, the
day she observed her Sabbath." The unemployment compensation
board denied her unemployment benefits because she refused to accept a job that would require her to work on Saturdays. s° Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, first found that the burden on Sherbert's religion was severe; in effect, she was being penalized (denied
a government benefit) because she refused to violate a central tenet
of her faith."' Next, Justice Brennan asked whether the state could
justify this burden with a compelling state interest. 2 Justice Brennan
concluded that the state could not demonstrate a compelling interest in denying benefits to a Saturday Sabbatarian." Further, the state
was not able to show that "no alternative form of regulation" would
satisfy the state interest.'
Although Sherbert seemed to signal the dawn of a new day for
protecting religious rights, in practice the compelling state interest
test failed to offer significant protection for religious conduct. Except for the limited exception for unemployment compensation
cases s- and the factually unique case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,-" the Supreme Court has never used the compelling state interest test to require a religious exception to a neutral, generally applicable law.
In the years between the Sherbert decision and the Court's repudiation of the compelling state interest test, 7 the Court never looked
beyond the belief/conduct dichotomy to classify religious conduct as
pure speech, expressive conduct, or conduct. Rather, the Court upheld statutes adversely affecting a wide variety of religious activities:
" See id. at 399.
30

See id. at 399-401.

31 See id. at 404.
32 See id. at 406-07.

" Se id. at 408-09.
34

See Sherbert 374 U.S. at 407.

See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, Amish parents challenged a law mandating a high school education for children. See id. at 208-09. The
Court granted the parents' request for an exemption from this law, citing the
uniqueness of the Amish faith and the success of the Amish's own "life training" for
Amish teenagers. See id. at 234-36.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990) (discussed infra at

notes 42-44 and accompanying text).
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mandatory payment of social security taxes by a religious objector to
the social security system;" denial of tax benefits to a private, religious school that banned interracial dating and marriage pursuant to
religious doctrine;-" mandatory acceptance of wages by religious
"associates" working in businesses to support the religion;40 and a
government requirement that a Native American child be provided
with a social security number to receive AFDC benefits, despite the
family's belief that the provision and4 use of the social security number would rob the child of her spirit. '
2.

A Return to Reynold. No Protection for Religious
Conduct
In 1990 the Court in Employment Division v. Smith expressly
abandoned the compelling state interest test. In Smith, the Court, by
a narrow vote, held that religious exemptions need not be given
from neutral laws of general applicability.4' Thus, the government
does not need to demonstrate a compelling, or even a reasonable,
state interest in order to enforce a law infringing upon religious
conduct, no matter how serious the burden is on a particular religious practice."4
In response to this apparent "backtrack" in the area of free exercise rights, Congress took the unusual step of legislating an
"override" of Smith. In 1994, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).4" The Act purported to "turn the clock back
to the day before Smith," Congress, in essence, instructed courts to
ignore Smith and apply the compelling state interest test in cases involving 4requests
for religious exemptions from laws of general appli7
cability.
SSee United

States v.Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).

Se BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1988).
See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306
(1985).
41 SeeBowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696, 712
(1986).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
43 See id. at 879.
40

Of course, this does not apply to rules that specifically target certain religious
groups or practices. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). The Court did infer an exception for so-called "hybrid"
cases. Se text accompanying infra notes 178-192.
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
6 SH.R. REP. No. 88 (1993).
41 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1994).
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The Supreme Court, however, declared RFRA unconstitutional
as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. lores." Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, declared that Congress had exceeded its power
to enforce the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment by attempting "a substantive change in constitutional protections," proscribing state conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment itself does not prohibit. 8 The Court stated that
the enforcement powers of Con aress are only preventative or remedial in nature, not substantive.
Therefore, the Court held that
Congress can only specifically target and cure state laws that regulate
religion in an unconstitutional manner."
In determining whether RFRA could be considered enforcement legislation, the Court first noted that "there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved [and
that] the appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered
in light of the evil presented."5 2 Justice Kennedy noted the dearth of
laws aimed particularly at religion and pointed out Congress's failure
to cite any such laws in the legislative history of the statute."'
Recognizing that the legislative history is not dispositive, Justice
Kennedy went on to state that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."' The Court explained that unlike other remedial measures
passed by Congress, RFRA applied to all government agencies in all
areas of government. 5 All an individual needed to do under RFRA
to trigger a heightened level of scrutiny was show a substantial burden on her exercise of religion---a claim that a court is in a poor position to dispute." Thus, Justice Kennedy noted, RFRA did not target specific state laws that are likely to be unconstitutional. 7 Instead,
RFRA imposed a "least restrictive means" test on all legislation." The

117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
Id. at 2170.
50 See id. at 2164.
4

49

51 See
52

53

id.at2170.
Id. at 2169.
Seei&.

Forns, 117 S. CL at 2170.
Said.
56 Sa id.
5

58

seeid-
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Court held that this broad scope took RFRA out of the legitimate enforcement powers of Congress."
Although, at a minimum, this decision seems to restore the
Smith standard to free exercise cases brought under state laws, it remains unclear what the applicable standard is and how long it will
remain in effect. Some lower courts have attempted to limit Smith to
cases involving criminal sanctions, stating that the Sherbert strict scrutiny test should still apply in civil cases. ® Further, only days after the
Fores decision, some commentators were calling for a constitutional
amendment guaranteeing heightened scrutiny in free exercise
cases." Another possibility is a change in the Court itself. Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Fores called for a reconsideration of Smith,
stating that "Smith adopted an improper standard for deciding free
exercise claims.., supported neither by precedent nor.., by history." 2 The refusal of the Court in Pores to overrule Smith, however,
indicates that despite changes on the Court since Smith the demise of
Smith is not imminent.
C. Treatment of Religious Speech
As the foregoing discussion suggests, religious conduct has not
fared well under either the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert or the "nontest" of Smith. As demonstrated by Smith and F/ores, the Court seems
to have retreated to the inflexible dichotomy of Reyno/ds. Thus, if
the law impinges upon the purely mental realm of belief, the law will
be invalidated. If, however, any conduct is involved, even conduct
that is communicative in nature, the Free Exercise Clause will provide absolutely no protection.
The Court's application of the Reyno/ds belief/conduct dichotomy, however, ignores that religion involves more than mere belief
on the one hand and completely unprotected conduct on the other.
Many, if not most, religions have a communal aspect wherein believers gather to express their beliefs through both pure speech and expressive conduct. Thus, religion is better considered along a continuum, with "pure belief" at one end and "conduct" at the other.
Between the two, moving from belief toward conduct, are "pure"
speech (verbal prayer, sermons, verbal proselytizing) and "expressive
59 See id. at2172.
60 SeeAmerican Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1407
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (D.N.M. 1991).
61 See generally Robert Marguand, High Court Clips Protections for Religious Freedom
in U.S., CHRLSIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, June 26, 1997, at 1.
62 FNores, 117 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
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conduct" (Catholic sacraments, distribution of literature, the wearing
of religious garments)." Although religious conduct understandably
cannot be given completely free reign in a democratic society, the
same is not necessarily true the closer one moves up the continuum
toward belief.
The Court has recognized a similar continuum in the free
speech area. The Reynolds dichotomy, however, has prevented the
Court from distinguishing between purely religious speech, expressive conduct, and nonexpressive conduct in the realm of free exercise. The Court has simply failed to recognize that certain religious
practices, such as the wearing of a yarmulke, may be expressive conduct because the conduct is intended to convey a message about the
wearer's religious beliefs.
Certainly, it is not always easy to determine when religious conduct is meant to be expressive. For example, in Smith, the Court
noted that the purpose of using peyote is to bring the user to a
higher level of religious understanding, not to communicate a message to third parties." Others have argued, however, that the sacramental use of peyote communicates a message about the user's identity as a member of the religion.6 Yet the mere difficulty of
determining what conduct is expressive should not excuse the Court
from recognizing that religious conduct may be expressive.
The status of even pure religious speech is questionable under
the Court's current test. Although the content of pure religious
speech arguably has never been the subject of legislative, executive,
or judicial interference, speech is not purely a mental function. As
such, religious speech is not entitled to any level of protection under
the Free Exercise Clause.
The question of what constitutes "expressive conduct" for purposes of
the
Free Speech Clause is far from resolved. For purposes of this article, expressive
conduct can be considered action that is intended to convey a message and is likely
to be understood in context. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10
(1974) (holding that display of flag with peace symbol attached is expressive conduct when considered in context). For example, if someone bums an American
flag in order to start a forest fire, the conduct of burning the flag is not expressive.
If, on the other hand, a war protester bums an American flag in protest of the
United States's involvement in a war, the conduct is expressive. See R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 418 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Valerie L.
Brown, Hate Speech in Collges and Universitie--The Aftemah of RAN.v. City of St.
Paul, Minnesota, 79 Etgc. L. REP. 697, 699 (1993).
44 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
882 (1990).
as See David B. Salmons, Toward a Fullr Understandingof Religious Exercise: Recognizing the Identity-Generativeand Expresive Nature of Religioa Deuotion, 62 U. Ci-. L.
Rav. 1243, 1256 (1995).
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Until recently, this has not been an issue. Although religious
speech, qua speech, has never been criminalized," the conviction of
Sheik Rahman appears to have altered the landscape. Rahman has
been convicted of a crime seemingly involving pure religious
speech--giving religious advice to terrorists.6 7 This conviction could
be the first in a series of cases involving religious speech and expressive conduct. Thus, religious speech is likely to become one of the
next issues in free exercise jurisprudence.
II.

PROHIBIONS ON SECULAR SPEECH

Unlike religious speech,68 secular speech has enjoyed a history
of relatively strict protection under the law. 9 As a general rule, the
content of pure secular speech may not be regulated by the state.
Several exemptions to this general prohibition, however, do exist.0
For example, "low value" speech, such as obscenity and fighting
words, is considered "unprotected" and thus may be freely reguCourts have analyzed religious speech under the Establishment Clause in
.equal access" cases. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 236 (1981) (religious
student group at state university challenged university's policy of allowing nonreligious student groups to use university facilities for group events, but refusing access
to religious student groups). For purposes of deciding whether a church should be
allowed to use facilities in a semi-public forum such as a school, religious speech is
treated just like secular speech. See id. at 270 n.6. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Establishment Clause cannot be used to exclude religious
speech from public and semi-public forums. See, e.g., id.; Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (showing of religious film
series, after hours on public school property, would not violate the Establishment
Clause); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838-46
(holding that university's payment of printing costs for Christian newspaper, on
equal grounds as other nonreligious student publications, would not violate the Establishment Clause). Thus, for forum purposes, religious speech is treated exactly
like secular speech. This does not assist us, however, in determining whether religious speech can be criminalized.
See infra notes 146-152 and accompanying text. Available information on the
Rahman case supports the conclusion that Rahman's crime was limited to speech.
If, however, the evidence against Rahman include nonspeech crimes, my conclusion about Rahman, although not my analysis, would be different.
68 In Establishment Clause cases, religious speech has enjoyed at
least the same
level of protection as secular speech.
69 Of course, the legislature has substantial leeway to make content-neutral regulations limiting speech, such as time, place, and manner restrictions. For a good
overview of the scope of permissible content-neutral regulations, see LAuRF.Nc H.
TRImE, AMERCAN CONsTruToNAL LAw § 12-23, at 977-86 (2d ed. 1988). This Article
is concerned only with content-based regulations on speech.
70 For example, speech that is obscene is generally afforded
less protection under the First Amendment and can be regulated by the legislature. See, e.g., Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Similarly, "fighting words" may be regulated and
punished. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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lated.7 ' Of the categories of unprotected speech, the three most
relevant to the issue of terroristic speech are the advocacy of illegal
conduct,' hate speech, and threats. Further, even if speech does not
fall within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech, it
may be regulated if the regulation is narrowly tailored to address a
compelling state interest73
A.

Advocacy of lUegal Conduct

The government's first attempt to regulate pure speech based
on its content was the Sedition Act of 1798.' The Sedition Act stated
[t]hat if any person shall write, print, utter or publish... any
false, scandalous, and malicious writing... against the government... Congress... or The President... with intent to defame... or to excite against them.., the hatred of the good
people... or to stir up sedition.., for opposing or resisting
any
75
law... or act ... then such person [shall be convicted].
The Act expired by its own terms on March 3, 1801.7'
The Sedition Act met with vehement opposition from men such
as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison." Before the Sedition Act's
expiration in 1801, however, many men were prosecuted and fined
under the Act for a variety of "seditious" conduct aimed at the party
in power---conduct that today would undeniably be protected by
the First Amendment." The Supreme Court never had occasion to

See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
Advocacy of illegal conduct is the most relevant exception for purposes of this
Article. First, the major case today, Rahman, involves the mixing of religious speech
with advocacy of illegal conduct. See infra notes 146-168. Second, on a practical
level, it is difficult to imagine penalizing religious speech that does not pose some
sort of danger to the community.
7
SeeWidmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
SSee Sedition Act, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
75 Id. §2.

6 Sid.§ 4.

7

See DoNALD

. MORGAN, CONGREs AND THE CoNsOTIoN:

RESpOnSyBILrY 57-58 (1966).
78 See,

A STUIDY OF

e.g., United States v. Haswell, 26 F. Cas. 218 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No.
15,324) (convicting editor and publisher of newspaper under the Act for publishing
advertisement; praising Lyons and discussing his prosecution in critical terms; fining him $200 and imprisoning him for two months); United States v. Cooper, 25 F.
Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (finding editor of newspaper guilty under
the Act; fining him $400; imprisoning him for six months); Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas.
1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798) (No. 8,646) (convicting member of federal legislature of
sedition under the Act for publishing material critical of the President; fining him
$1000 and sentencing him to four months injail).
" As Justice Brennan stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276
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decide the constitutionality of the Sedition Act; Jefferson however
was so disgusted with the Act that, upon becoming President, he
pardoned everyone convicted under the Act and remitted their
fines."
After the expiration of the Sedition Act, little attention apparently was paid to the ideas of sedition and seditious conspiracy until
the Civil War era. In July 1861, Congress enacted a criminal statute
making it illegal for two or more persons to "conspire to overthrow,
or to put down, or to destroy by force, the Government of the United
States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority [of the government of the United States] .""' This statute apparently saw little use after the Civil War until it was recently resurrected
by federal prosecutors in the Rahman case.
The next statute aimed at sedition was the Espionage Act of
1917." The Espionage Act has been used over the years to punish a
wide variety of activities. In fact, during World War I alone, more
than 2000 prosecutions were initiated under the Espionage Act."
The Espionage Act of 1917 served as the sounding board for determining the constitutionality of statutes addressing sedition. The
first test of the constitutionality of the Espionage Act came in 1919 in
Schenck v. United States.8 5 In that case, a leader of the United States
Socialist Party was convicted under the Espionage Act because he distributed anti-war pamphlets to new conscripts. 2 Writing for the
Court, Justice Holmes found that Schenck's conduct constituted a
"clear and present danger" to the United States's war effort.7 In
holding the statute constitutional, Justice Holmes stated that "the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir(1964), "Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this court, the attack upon
its validity has carried the day in the court of history." Id.
So Seid.

81 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1956) (formerly Acts 1861, ch. 33; 12 Stat. 284 (1861)).
This statute did not require any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
8 See infranotes 146-152 and accompanying text.
8s Pub. L. No. 24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). The Act was amended in 1940 and again
in 1953. It has been incorporated into some 30 different sub-6ections of three different tides of the U.S. Code. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 11 (1976), 791 (repealed 1961), 792794 (1994), 2888 (1948), 3241 (1958); 22 U.S.C. §§ 213 (1968), 220-222 (repealed
1948), 401 (1953), 402-405 (repealed 1958), 406 (1917), 407 (repealed 1953), 408
(1917); 50 U.S.C. §§ 191 (1979), 192 (1950), 194 (1950).
See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee ofFreedom of Expresion, 84 COLum. L. Rav. 91, 142 n.241 (1989).
9 249

U.S. 47 (1919).

MSee id. at 49.

See id. at 52; see also Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); Frohwerk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206-07 (1919) (decided the week after Schenck).
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cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. "U In essence, Schenck put forth a two-pronged
test: (1) the law must be aimed at "a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent " " and (2) the danger must be "present" or
"proximate."
The enunciation of the clear and present danger test in Schenck
was amazingly short-lived. Approximately one week later, Justice
Holmes, writing in two cases with very similar facts to Schenck, interpreting the same statute, changed his own test." Justice Holmes
abandoned use of the term "clear and present danger" and established a slightly different test in Debs v. United States.9 Debs requires
the government to show that (1) the speech has a "natural tendency
and reasonably probable effect of (2) bringing about a substantive
evil that Congress has power to prevent and (3) is uttered with spe9
cific intent to cause the substantive evil."
In its next term, in Abrams v. United States,94 the Supreme Court
again modified the "unlawful advocacy" test. In that case, the Court
essentially abandoned the requirement of a specific intent, stating
that "[m]en must be held to have intended, and to be accountable
for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce.""
The Court next eliminated the need for a "substantive evil" beyond the speech itself in Gitlow v. New York." That is, the Court gave
great deference to the government to determine whether certain
speech involves a danger of a substantive evil that the government
has a right to prevent; the question of whether the specific speech
was likely to bring about the evil need not be considered.7 The
speech itself may be the evil.
Schnek, 249 U.S. at 52.
Donald L. Beschle, An Absolutism That Works: Reviving the Original 'Clear and
Pr nt Danger' Test 1983 S. ILL. U. LJ. 127, 132. Since Congress has no right to
prevent speech qua speech, the "substantive evil" presumably must be something
more than mere speech. See id.
W Seeid. at 133.
91 See Debs, 249 U.S. at 216; Frohwerk,
249 U.S. at 209.
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
SSee Beschle, supra note 89, at 133.
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
95Id. at 621. It is interesting to note thatJustice Holmes, the author of Schenck,
Debs, and Frohwerk, dissented in Abrams. Justice Holmes believed that the government had not sufficiently proved intent, and felt that the leaflets in question did not
pose an "imminent danger" to the war effort. See id,at 627 (HolmesJ., dissenting).
268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
97

See id.Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis in dissent, argued that the
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Twenty-six years later, the Court once again changed the parameters of the "clear and present danger" test in Dennis v. United
States." In what has been called "a debacle for the First Amendment,"" the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a leader of the
Communist Party in the United States pursuant to the Smith AcL'0
The Court in Dennis claimed to be following Justice Holmes's formulation of the clear and present danger test; however, the Court actually adopted a very different version of that test. The Supreme Court
in Dennis actually adopted a test originally propounded by Judge
Learned Hand in the circuit court's opinion in Dennis.'0 ' In writing
the circuit court's opinion in Dennis, Judge Hand had "rephrased"
Holmes's rule as follows: "In each case [the court] must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."'" Chief
Justice Vinson, writing for the majority in Dennis, expressly adopted
this formulation.'03
In essence, this formulation introduced a balancing aspect to
the test. UnderJustice Holmes's formulation, two distinct elements
were needed: (1) a substantial harm within the ambit of Congress to
control and (2) imminent danger. Under this test, one element
could not offset the other. Conversely, under Judge Hand's formulation, each of these elements was balanced against the other. Thus,
for a harm as serious as the overthrow of government, almost any advocacy could be criminalized, no matter how unlikely the possibility
that the speaker actually stir anyone to action.14
The "clear and present danger" doctrine found its most modem
expression in Brandenburgv. Ohio.'05 In Brandenburg,the defendant, a
leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted pursuant to the Ohio

proper test--&henck's clear and present danger test---required actual danger of an
attempt to overthrow the government "at once." See id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissent-

ing).

341 U.S. 494, 510
(1951).

" Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the Brandenburg deciion-a &mgiver in

actim,JtuDicATuRE,July-Aug. 1995, at 27.
10 &eDennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17. The Smith Act was the first peacetime sedition
statute since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. See Smith Act of 1940, ch. 439, §§
2, 3, 5, 54 Stat. 670, 671 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
11 SeeDennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
1" United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
10s Sw Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
SmBeschle,
e4
supra note 89, at 136.
10"395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Criminal Syndicalism Act.!8 The statute prohibited "advocat[ing]
...the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."'o The United States Supreme Court held
the Ohio statute unconstitutional because it punished mere advocacy without reference to incitement of imminent lawless action.'
The Brandenburg decision did not explicitly refer to the clear
and present danger test. Rather, it seemed to build upon aspects of
each of the earlier, competing tests. In its final formulation,'"9 the
Brandenburgtest requires three things: "(1) express advocacy of law
violation; (2) the advocacy must call for immediate law violation; and
(3) the immediate law violation must be likely to occur. " "'
The Brandenburgformulation of the test for determining when
advocacy of illegal conduct can be punished remains in force today.
Although courts have occasionally distinguished cases as not falling
within the scope of the Brandenburgtest,"' it remains the modem test
for determining when speech advocating illegal conduct can be
criminalized.
B. Hate Speech
In recent years, the forum of free speech argument has moved
from sedition-type statutes to those seeking to regulate racist speech.
Legislatures have attempted to curb instances of racial violence
through the enactment of so-called "hate crime" legislation. Initially,
a distinction should be drawn between "hate crime" laws and "hate
speech" laws. 12 Hate crime laws generally criminalize violent acts
106
10

See id. at 444.
Id. at 445

1"' See id. at 449.

109 The original opinion, as drafted by Justice Fortas,
was much truer to Justice
Holmes's original formulation of the clear and present danger test than the Court
had ever been. See Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger
or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 Sup. Cr. Rzv. 209, 237. Following a recommendation of Justice Harlan, however, Justice Fortas withheld the opinion to coincide with the issuance of other opinions on the same subject. See id. In the meantime, Justice Fortas was forced to resign from the Court. See id. Justice Brennan
wrote the final opinion in Brandenburg, which essentially did away with Justice Holmes's formulation of the "clear and present danger" test in favor of what is more
properly called the "imminent lawless action test." See id.
Id. at 240.
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (advertising
illegal contraceptives cannot be characterized as an attempt to promote imminent
lawless action).
' This distinction is highlighted by Professor Anthony Winer. See Anthony S.
Wimer, The R.A.V. Case and the Distinction Between Hate Speech Laws and Hate Crime
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based on the perpetrator's negative perception of the victim, usually
the victim's perceived race, creed, color, gender, or religion."" Often, the acts specified in these laws are already illegal under other
criminal sections, such as assault and homicide laws." 4 When these
crimes are motivated by racial or other types of enumerated animus,
however, the perpetrator may face a greater penalty under the law." 5
Hate speech statutes, on the other hand, criminalize racist
speech (or other types of prohibited speech) independent of any accompanying criminal act. " Thus, the mere act of shouting a racial
epithet at a passerby can constitute an actionable criminal act. At
least one city has attempted to pass and enforce such a hate speech
law.117
The Supreme Court apparently sounded the death knell for
hate-speech legislation in RA.V. v. City of St. PauL"8 The City of St.
Paul had passed an ordinance that read, in pertinent part:
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misde6
meanor.""
Defendant RA.V. was arrested and charged with a violation of
this statute after placing a burning cross in the yard of a black family."' The trial court dismissed the charge, believing that the statute
was unconstitutional.12 ' The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal, however, and read the statute to prohibit only "fighting
words" as defined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.'22 As such, the
court held that this unprotected speech could be freely regulated.'n
Laws, 18 WM. MncTEL.L L. REv. 971, 974 (1992); see also Richard J. Williams, Jr.,
Burning Crosses and Blazing Words: Hate Speech and the Supreme Court's Free Speech
ClauseJursprudence,5 SEgoN HALL CoNsr. L.J. 609, 638-39 (1995) (recognizing a dichotomy between statutes proscribing conduct and statutes purporting to regulate
the expression of ideas).
U See Winer, supra note 112, at 974.
14 See id. at
975.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 976-77.
See, e.g., ST. PAUL, MINN., ORDINANcE § 292.02 (1990).
11 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
119 Id. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MiNN., ORDmAncE § 292.02 (1990)).
120 Seeid.
I See id.
122 See id. at 380-81 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (defining fighting words as words inflicting injury or inciting immediate
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding and unanimously found that the statute was
unconstitutional.'2 4 The Court was seriously divided, however, in its
reasoning. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's "narrowing" construction of the statute to
include only fighting words.'2 Justice Scalia, however, rejected the
idea that fighting words are absolutely unprotected by the First
Amendment. Justice Scalia held that, although fighting words may
be regulated, they may not be "made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctly proscribable content. Thus,
the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further
content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government."'2 The St. Paul statute applied "only to 'fighting words'
that insult, or provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender,'"'" but not to other fighting words; as such, the
ordinance could not withstand the First Amendment challenge.
In separate concurrences, Justices White and Stevens reasoned
that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, because it criminalized protected speech as well as fighting words. 8 Justice White
took the majority to task for what he called "its radical revision of
First Amendment law."'2 He believed that Justice Scalia was abandoning long-established law by restoring First Amendment protection, albeit a limited protection, for categories of speech such as
fighting words." °
The R.A. V. decision has cast a shadow on the future of hate
crime and hate speech legislation. Several state courts have relied
broadly upon R.A.V. to strike down hate crime legislation dealing
with expressive conduct.3 1 It is worth noting, however, that the
Court reached a somewhat contradictory result only one term after
R.A.V. in Wisconsin v. Mitchel 132 In Mitchell, a unanimous Court upbreach of peace by their very utterance)).
123 See id.
124 See RA.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
'2
Seeid. at381.
I" Id. at 383-84.
127 Id. at 391.

See id. at 397 (White,J, concurring); id. at 417 (Stevens,J., concurring).
I Id. at 407 (White,J, concurring).
130 See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 414-15 (White,J, concurring).
1 See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 757 (Md. 1993) (hate crime statute
was unconstitutional under RA. V. because it regulated the content of speech); State
v. Vawter, 136 N.J. 56, 64-67, 642 A.2d 349, 353-55 (1994) (same); State v. Talley,
858 P.2d 217, 230-31 (Wash. 1993) (same).
'
508 U.S. 476 (1993).
128
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held a penalty-enhancement statute.'" Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery was increased when the trial court found that Mitchell
had intentionally selected his victim based on the victim's race.""
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the penaltyenhancing statute was constitutional because it "is aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment."" Justice Rehnquist distinguished RA.V., stating that the statute in RA.V. was aimed at speech,
whereas the statute in Mitchell was aimed at unprotected conduct-assault."
The present constitutional status of legislation purporting to
regulate purely secular speech that is also characterized as hate
speech is less than clear. As shown in R.A.V., the Court has been increasingly reluctant to uphold laws criminalizing pure speech. Despite the generally perceived "conservative" nature of the current
Court, the decision in RA. V. may be a signal that protection for pure
speech is again on the rise.
C. Threats
A third type of speech may be implicated in an analysis of religiously motivated terrorism-threats. Religiously motivated terroristic
speech obviously threatens someone, just like advocacy of unlawful
action and hate speech. Unlike the latter types of speech, however,
threats have received little First Amendment scrutiny. As one commentator has stated, "For most writers, criminalizing verbal threats of
violence is not constitutionally problematic. " '-"
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the First
Amendment concerns brought about by anti-threat legislation in
only two cases.? In Watts v. United States,'" the Court, in a per curium opinion, upheld the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing
threats against the President.'40 The Court minimally recognized
that the statute had First Amendment implications, but made the assumption that threats are not protected speech: "What is a threat
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected
See id. at 490.
See id. at 479.
13 Id. at 487.
l3 Sm id.
"'

134

1 John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF.L.
REV. 653, 661 (1994).

SSee R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705 (1969).
13 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
14
See id. at 707.
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1 The Court avoided analyzing this distinction, however, by
speech."M
finding that the defendant in Watts was merely engaging in "political
hyperbole.""' Thus, the constitutionality of anti-threat legislation
was merely assumed, not analyzed.
More recently, Justice Scalia's opinion in RA.V, discussed, in
dicta, the constitutional status of threats. Justice Scalia, citing Watts,
assumed that "threats of violence are outside the First Amendment."'3 As discussed above, however, RA.V. was decided as a case
involving hate speech, not threats. Thus, once again, the constitutionality of anti-threat legislation received no constitutional scrutiny.
In the absence of a true analysis by the Supreme Court of the
First Amendment status of threats, states have enacted a plethora of
laws criminalizing pure speech that is considered threatening. Almost every state and the federal government have passed some type
of law criminalizing the making of threats.'" These laws have yet to
face a rigorous First Amendment review.

III. WHEN RELIGIOUS SPEECH IS TERRORISTIC

As noted above, until now pure religious speech apparently has
never been considered dangerous enough to criminalize. No reported case prosecuted under any of the sedition laws has directly
involved religiously motivated speech. The first constitutional test of
the criminalization of pure religious4 speech is likely to come in the
case of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.'
A.

United States v. Rahman

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a Muslim cleric, was convicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York of seditious conspiracy under a little-used, Civil War-era sedition
statute.' * Several of Rahman's followers were tried with him and
convicted of seditious conspiracy involving plots to blow up the Lincoln Tunnel and a variety of government buildings."' Although cer141

Id.
Id. at 708.
14 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
I4 See Edward Comitz, Extinguishing the Burning Crosse: Washington's Malicious
14

Harassment Statute in Light of the Issues of Overbreadth and Vagueness, 16 U. PUGET

SouNDL. Rzv. 373, 374 (1992).
1 See supranote 12 and accompanying text
1
See Mike Doming, Muslim Cleric Backed Terror, Lawyers Stress, CHi. Tam., Sept.
15, 1995, at Al.
1 In a separate trial not directly involving Rahman, some of his followers were
tried and convicted in the World Trade Center bombing. See Randolph, supra note
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tain documents in the case have been sealed and (as of this writing)
remain under seal, indications are that Rahman's role in the
"conspiracy" was limited to fiery sermons and dispensing religious
advice in the form of interpretations of Islamic law.'" In short,
Rahman's terrorist followers would seek their religious leader's advice about whether certain terrorist plots were sanctioned by the
Qu'ran and Islamic law.'" There is apparently no evidence that
Rahman ever came in contact with, let alone touched, an explosive
device or otherwise participated in the conspiracy."5
Rahman's conviction on the seditious conspiracy charge, therefore, seems to be based on pure religious speech. No conduct, even
"expressive conduct," was involved."' Rahman was convicted on several charges and sentenced to a life term for providing religious
leadership
to terrorists.A notice
of appeal
the United States
Court of Appeals
for the Second
Circuit
has beentofiled.'"
B. Resolution of the Rahman Appeal
On appeal, the Second Circuit will have several options available
to decide whether Rahman can be punished for his speech. Given
the Supreme Court's historic tendency to treat religious speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,"" it is likely that
a free speech test will be used. It is most likely that the Rahman case
will be scrutinized under the Brandenburgstandard because Rahman
was charged with seditious conspiracy---a charge that is generally
scrutinized under an "advocacy of illegal conduct" standard.'"
4, at Al.
1
See Joseph Grinstein, Jihad and the Constitution: The Frst Amendment Implications of CombatingReligiouslyMotivated Terrorism, 105 YAL L.J. 1347, 1352 (1996).
14 See id. at 1351-53.
So Seeid.
1 Unlike other criminal conspiracy statutes, the statute used by Rahman's
prosecutors does not require any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id.
at 1351-53 & n.32. While others involved in the conspiracy certainly engaged in
overt nonspeech acts, there seems to be no evidence of any nonspeech overt act by
Rahman. See id.
152 See Doming, supra note 146, at Al.
Commentators sometimes seemed to ignore that Rahman was also tried and convicted on other charges, including conspiring to murder a foreign official, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. See
United States v. Rahman, No. S393Cr.181, 1994 WL 388927, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22,
1994).
3 See Rahman, 1994 WL 388927, at *2, appeal docketed,
No. 96-1044 (2d Cir. Jan.
22, 1996) (decision is pending).
See supranotes 22-24 and accompanying text.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Rahman was not charged
with making threats nor with any hate speech crime; therefore, those categories of
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1. Rahman's case under Brandenburg
The Brandenburg test distinguishes between protected speech
and unprotected speech." Rahman's speech is not protected under
Brandenburgif Rahman (1) expressly advocated violence, (2) called
for imminent law violation, and (3) the imminent law violation was
likely to occur' 7 In this case, the limited evidence available to the
public indicates that Rahman expressly advocated violence and that
the violence was likely to occur. The problem, as is often the case in
Brandenburgtype cases, lies in the interpretation of the word
"imminent."
The definition of "imminence" has not been scrutinized, or
even directly considered, by the Supreme Court. In Hess v. Indiana, the Court overturned the disorderly conduct conviction of an
anti-war demonstrator!" Hess, while at a demonstration, uttered the
words, "'We'll take the fucking street later.'"'60 The Court first recognized that the exhortation was not really "advocacy" of anything;
therefore, Hess's speech could not be punished under Brandenburg.'6 ' The Court went on to say, however, that "at worst, [Hess's
speech] amounted to nothing6 2more than advocacy of illegal action at
some indefinite future time."
It is not clear, however, that "imminence," as used in Brandenburg, is always interpreted in its normal temporal sense. Indeed, one
commentator, David Crump, has argued that courts interpret the
"imminence" requirement as a "probability" requirement: if the violent response to the speech is probable, even at some future time,
speech are not at issue in his case.
156 Actually, there is some debate whether Brandenburg categorizes seditious
speech as "unprotected" or whether Brandenburgis merely a specialized formulation
of the compelling state interest test. Compare Gerald R. Smith, Note, Media Liability
for PhysicalInjury Resultingfim the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1193, 1203
(1988) (noting that Brandenburg establishes incitement as a form of unprotected
speech) with Karl S. Coplan, Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment Context, 84 CoLuM. L. REv. 144, 169 n.136 (1984) (implying that Brandenburg's
"clear and present danger" test is a stricter type of compelling state interest test).
Although the latter theory is intellectually tantalizing, it does not seem to be a
popular opinion, even among academics. Certainly, courts interpreting Brandenburg lean toward the idea that advocacy of unlawful conduct is unprotected speech.
For purposes of this Article, I accept the interpretation of Brandenburgas a test for
determining whether the speech in question is protected.
157 See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
15 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
159 See id. at 109.
160 Id. at 107.
161

162

See id. at 108-09.
Id. at 108.
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the speech can be reu~lated.6 In support of this argument, Crump
cites People v. Rubin. In that case, a California appellate court held
that an open solicitation to kill Nazi demonstrators at a demonstra-

tion five weeks away was sufficiently probable to meet the imminence
test of Brandenburg,despite the temporal remoteness of the acts.'"
Although some courts have undoubtedly applied a "probability"
test, this interpretation of Brandenburgis not necessarily accurate or

intellectually sound. One of the primary models of free speech jurisprudence is the "marketplace of ideas" model that was first enunciated by Justice Holmes in his Abrams dissent.'6 6 The Supreme Court
has used this model to fashion free speech law for several decades. ' 67
In the marketplace of ideas, all speech is free to compete, even "bad

speech." The only justification for curtailing speech is when the circumstances surrounding the speech are such that action may be

taken before competing ideas are heard. As Justice Holmes stated:
"It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring
it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion .... "'
Thus, probable conduct that is not temporally imminent could be subjected to the marketplace of ideas. Other
speakers have the time to attempt to sway the actor. Further, the actor himself has time to reflect upon the speaker's words and weigh

163

Se David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative

Torts, and the Borderland ofthe Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REv. 1, 59-61 & nn.304-11
(1994).
164 See id. at 59-60 n.350 (citing People v. Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Cal. App.
1979)).
165 See Rubin, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 494. Similarly, in United States v. Gompton, 428 F.2d
18, 22 (2d Cir. 1970), decided before Hess, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a threat to kill the President two weeks in the future
was a punishable threat.
A SeeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market."). Justice Holmes borrowed the idea from John
Milton and John Stuart Mill. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, reprinted in 2
COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 486 (E. Sirluck ed., 1959); JoHN STuART
MiL, ON LIBERwY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVMENT 13-48 (R.B.
McCallum ed., 1948); Stanley Ingler, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DuE LJ. 1, nn.4, 5.
167 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S.
622, 660-61 (1994) (invoking the marketplace theory to justify a regulation requiring cable television operators to carry broadcast networks); Leathers v. Medlock,
499 U.S. 439, 451-53 (1991) (noting that a generally applicable tax on cable television services is not a differential tax that would distort the marketplace of ideas);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (explaining that commercial speech
has value in the marketplace of ideas).
I" Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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their value, as well as time to consider the illegality of his own acts.
Therefore, only speech that threatens a temporally imminent evil
should be curtailed.
Further, applying the probability interpretation of Brandenburg
to the Rahman case ignores one important distinction between Rahman's case and cases such as United States v. Compton"' and People v.
Rubin.7 In Compton and Rubin, the violence may not have been temporally imminent, but it was set for a specific date. In Rahman's
case, the available evidence does not show that Rahman's sermons
"set the date" for the lawless action. Rahman's sermons were apparently aimed at the indeterminate future."
2.

Rahman's Case Under the Compelling State Interest
Test

In the unlikely event that the Brandenburgtest is not met, or not
applied, the Second Circuit may analyze the case under the compelling state interest test of free speech jurisprudence.'
Although
"strict scrutiny" in an equal protection context almost always means
that the statute will not pass muster,"
in the free speech context
regulations are sometimes held to be valid.1 4 In Rahman's case, it
would be difficult to argue that preventing terrorism is not a compelling state interest. The only question would be whether the means
used-criminalizing speech having a tendency to advocate terrorism-are narrowly tailored to meet this goal. Because the statute
purports to regulate only speech that constitutes a conspiracy to

169

428 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1970).

170 158 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Cal. App. 1979).
1

From the point of view of law enforcement officials, the threat of violence in

the indeterminate future may well be more problematic than that set for a specific
date. For constitutional purposes, however, only the imminent threat can be proscribed.
172 A content-based regulation, such as the seditious conspiracy statute used in
Rahman's case, is unconstitutional unless it either falls within one of the narrow
categories of unprotected speech, such as the advocacy of unlawful conduct exception, or is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. See LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSnTI~mONAL LAw § 12-8, at 833 (2d ed. 1988).
17s The exception to this is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
In Korematsu, the Court upheld Congress's use of racial classifications tojustify the detention ofJapanese Americans during World War II. See id. at 223-24. The Court gave
great deference to the judgment of Congress and the military that the wholesale
exclusion of Japanese Americans from certain West Coast areas was a military imperative. See id. at 218.
174 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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overthrow the government,"-' it is difficult to imagine the Supreme
Court, especially the current Court, finding that the statute is not
narrowly tailored.
This finding would, however, overlook the true import of the
strict scrutiny standard. This standard is used when the government
tries to curtail admittedly protected speech based on its content-an
inherently suspicious activity. A finding that the statute is narrowly
tailored would, in essence, introduce a balancing aspect into the
strict scrutiny standard. The more compelling the interest, the easier it would be to find that the statute is narrowly tailored. This result is precisely what the Court reached in Korematsu v. United
States"7 6-a decision that is widely perceived as wrongly decided and a
constitutional aberration.'1 Rahman's case would be different if it fit
into the narrow area where the words themselves are the harm, such
as in the context of treason by disclosing national security secrets.
Here, Rahman's words were not the harm sought to be avoided. The
harm sought to be avoided by the statute-the overthrow by force of
the United States government--was caused by the volitional acts of
Rahman's followers. In a case in which the harm is not caused by the
words themselves, it is difficult to believe that a statute criminalizing
the utterance of the words is narrowly tailored. Yet it is equally difficult to believe that this Court would decide the issue in Rahman's favor. Under either free speech standard, therefore, it is likely that
Rahman's conviction will be upheld, despite the religious aspects of
Rahman's speech.
3.

Rahman's Case as a Free Exercise Claim under Smith

It is also possible, although unlikely, that the Second Circuit will
recognize the religious nature of the speech and deal with it under
the Free Exercise Clause. Given the less-than-liberal history of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, however, it is unlikely that freedom of religious speech will carry the day
under this analysis.

17s

See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2384 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2384 (West Supp.

1995).

176 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
177 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.

200, 236 (1995) (Justice

O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated, "Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even
'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification"); see alsoJames M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Separation of Powers Doctrine: Straining
Out Gnats, Swallowing Camels?, 18 PEiP. L. REv. 95, 114 n.98 (noting that Korematsu
was wrongly decided).
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If the Second Circuit analyzes Rahman's case under Smith, there
can be no doubt that the Supreme Court would uphold a curtailment of Rahman's free exercise of his right to religious speech. In
effect, Rahman would be seeking a religious exemption from a neutral law of general applicability, like the sedition statute. Under
Smith, the state has no obligation to grant his request for an exemption, or even to give the requested exemption any serious consideration.
4.

Rahman's Case as a Hybrid Free Exercise Claim Under
Smith

Perhaps the most interesting question is what result would be
reached by applying the hybrid exception created by Justice Scalia in
Smith. In Smith, Justice Scalia stated:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and
of the press."o
Any case involving religious speech must, by definition, involve
speech; thus, the hybrid test must come into play.
The parameters of the hybrid test are far from clear. Justice
Scalia appeared to be saying that, when a free exercise claim is coupled with another constitutional claim, the claims are entitled to a
heightened level of scrutiny, although the Justice did not elaborate
on the level of scrutiny that should be applied.' The lower courts
have not been consistent in their application of the hybrid test. At
least one court has refused to apply the Smith hybrid standard until
after the Supreme Court clarifies the test.' 80 Other courts have recognized the viability of the test, but have not applied it because the
non-free exercise claims failed on their own merits. 81 Thus, after
178 Se Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).

179 See id.
It See Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
181 See, e.g., Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
78 (1.996) (involving claim brought by couple under Free Exercise and Due Process
Clauses when the government sought to condemn a parcel of land containing the
gravesite of their stillborn child; court declined to apply the hybrid test because
substantive due process claim failed on its own merits); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.
Supp. 1537, 1546-47 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that challenge to Utah Abortion Act
on Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause grounds failed because free speech claim
failed; therefore, no hybrid situation was present).
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eliminating the non-free exercise claims, the remaining free exercise
claim could not be considered a hybrid.
Only two courts seem to have actually applied any version of the
hybrid test.'82 In Alabama & Coushatta Tribs v. Big Sandy Independent
School Distri1'" the court applied heightened scrutiny where the
plaintiffs made claims based on free exercise, free speech, due process, and equal protection rights. The court found that the regulation at issue, a school ban against long hair, failed under a free
speech analysis and a procedural due process analysis but survived
under an equal protection analysis.'8 The free exercise claim was
therefore entitled to some type of heightened scrutiny under the
Smith hybrid exception.' M
In the second case applying the hybrid test, Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman," the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was faced with a challenge to ajuror affirmation by an atheist
who claimed that even a "God-free" affirmation was religious in nature. 1 7 The judge ordered the atheist, Robin Murray-O'Hair,
jailed."' Murray-O'Hair and the Society of Separationists brought an
action against the judge.'" The Fifth Circuit ruled that the judge's
actions violated Murray-O'Hair's free exercise right, noting that the
free exercise right was coupled with a free speech right.'98 The court
stated, "Thus Smith specifically excepts religion-plus-speech cases
from the sweep of its holding." 1 The Fifth Circuit did not make explicit the level of scrutiny it was applying under the hybrid exception
but instead seemed to treat the case as one in which the government

182

See Society of Separationiits, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir.),

affd en bane, 959 F.2d 1283 (1992); Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
i 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
184 See id. at 1334, 1335, 1836.
la The court was apparently unsure exactly what level of scrutiny to apply to a
hybrid claim. The court began by noting that more than a mere rational relationship was required. See id. at 1332. The court did not, however, apply a Sherbert-type
compelling state interest test. It explained that the regulation was not a valid means
of achieving the school's goal because of the "lack of evidence on less restrictive,
alternative means of achieving these goals." Id. at 1333. Thus, the court appeared
to be applying a wholly new test: The regulation must further a valid state interest
and must be the least restrictive means of serving that interest
18s 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir.), aff'd en bane, 959 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1992).
18

See id. at 1209.

1s Se id.
188 Seeid.
190

See id. at 1216.

191

Id.
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was compelling affirmation of a religious belief. The Fifth Circuit,
however, held that the judge was immune from suit."
Although Justice Scalia's hybrid test might produce a result that
is protective of religious speech, this test ultimately is not acceptable
for several reasons. First, the test is an ex post facto attempt by the
Supreme Court to escape precedent. Not one of the cases mentioned by Justice Scalia as being a "hybrid" case relies expressly upon
more than one constitutional basis.
Second, aside from its dubious origins, the hybrid test affords
religious speech only as much protection as secular speech, but no
more. A hybrid case is subject only to the same standard as contentbased regulations of secular speech. If the free speech issue falls, the
case is not a hybrid case and thus the challenged law is valid. If the
free speech claim succeeds, the statute is invalid, and no analysis of
the free exercise claim is necessary. Thus, the free exercise claim becomes a nullity. There is no recognition of the unique genre of religious speech, nor is the level of protection offered consistent with
the special place religious speech occupies in our Constitution.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TEST FOR RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Any judicial test that is properly protective of religious speech
will necessarily involve a departure from precedent. The test I propose is premised on the idea that the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution is an independent source of a right-that the clause
conveys rights different from those conveyed by the Free Speech
Clause. 91' If the Free Exercise Clause is to be considered as an independent source of a right, it follows that the protection given to religious speech need not merely be coextensive with that protection
given to secular speech. In fact, under any interpretation of the current status of the law, religious speech receives only that protection
afforded to secular speech.
The test I propose will afford religious speech the level of protection its dual constitutional status deserves, while affording society
the protection it needs. The test requires two inquiries: (1) deter'

On rehearing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with-

out reaching the merits of the case, held that Murray-O'Hair had no standing to

sue. See Herman, 959 F.2d at 1285-86.
'
While it seems to be widely accepted that the Free Exercise Clause does provide an independent, substantive right, this is not without debate. Michael Ariens
and Robert Destro, for example, suggest that Smith stands for the proposition that
the Free Exercise Clause alone does not provide a constitutional basis for protecting
religious action. See MiCHAEL S. Aims & ROBERT A. DEmTo, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLuRAisc Socxtrv 948 (1996).
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mining whether the claim is a religious claim and (2) if so, determining the appropriate level of scrutiny.
When a statute attempts to criminalize speech, the first inquiry
must be whether the speech sought to be regulated is religious. Indeed, the classifying of speech as religious is the heart of the test and
is likely to prove the most difficult part to apply. The Supreme Court
has often shown a reluctance to adopt an explicit definition of religion.'" Some commentators argue that the mere attempt to define
religion is, in and of itself, unconstitutional.""' Despite this, however,
the Court does currently, if quietly, have a working definition of religion that is the backdrop for free exercise cases.
That definition was originally set forth in Seeger v. United States! "
In this conscientious objector case, the Court, ignoring a theistic
definition of religion set forth by Congress in the conscientious objector statute, created its own, highly expansive definition of religion.
The Court looked to whether the beliefs in question were sincere
and meaningful and whether the beliefs "occup[y] a place in the belief of its possessor parallel to that filled by an orthodox belief in
God."'" The Court also asked whether the belief is of ultimate concern to an individual.'"
The definition is, of course, highly malleable. What is of ultimate concern to an individual is an intensely personal matter that
may not be easily understood or interpreted by a court. Adopting
the Seeger formulation as a working definition of religion, however,
would hardly be more malleable than many other standards under
which the Court operates.
Even if the Seeger formulation is not considered viable, there is a
plethora of other options available to the Court.'" Defining religion
1

For a discussion of the Supreme Court's history of defining religion, see Ste-

ven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh:

Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31

EMoRY L.J. 973, 977-82 (1982).
195 See Francis J. Conklin, Conscientious Objectr Provisions: A View in the Light of
Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252, 277 (1963).
1
380 U.S. 163 (1965). Although both Seger and Welsh dealt with statutory
definitions of religion, commentators generally agree that the definition is constitutional. See Collier, supra note 194, at 982.
19 Id. at 166.
19 Seeid.
I

See, e.g., Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 22

CUMB. L. REv. 1 (1991); Collier, supra note 194; James M. Donovan, God is as God
Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of "Religion," 6 SrroN HALL CONST. L.J. 23
(1995); Richard 0. Frame, Belief in a NonmaterialReality-A Proposed First Amendment
Definition of Religion, 1992 U. IuL L. REv. 819; Timothy L. Hall, The Sacred and the
Profane: A FirstAmendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139 (1982). These
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has tantalized commentators and frustrated lower courts for many
years. The point is simply that a definition could and should be
formulated by the Court that would allow it to determine whether
speech is religiously motivated.
If the speech in question is determined to be religious, the second step is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied.2 Under this test, the level of scrutiny depends upon whether
the speech itself is a substantive evil, or whether the speech merely
advocates an evil. If the speech itself causes the harm, as in the case
of treason by disclosing military secrets to an enemy of the United
States, the speech should be regulated under the free exercise/compelling state interest test, regardless of its religious nature.
If, however, the words merely advocate a substantive evil, the speech
should not be criminalized.
In essence, this test requires a return to the pre-Gito °1' era for
religious speech. Prior to Gitlow, speech itself generally was not
deemed to be a substantive evil. In Gitlow, however, the Court accepted the idea that advocacy of illegal conduct was a harm in and of
itself, independent of the harm of the illegal conduct.'
Actually, the successful application of this test lies in the understanding that very few types of speech are inherently "evil." Disclosure of national secrets is one of those few areas. In that scenario,
disclosure of the secret is the harm. No illegal act of a third party is
necessary in order for harm to result. Similarly, in defamation cases,
the lie told is the harm-no further evil is anticipated. Conversely,
advocacy of illegal conduct and solicitation envision a harm beyond
the speech--the commission of the crime advocated or solicited is
the real evil. 25 In these cases, the religiously motivated speaker
should be afforded full First Amendment protection.
articles are but a few among many addressing the issue of defining religion for constitutional purposes.
"0 If the speech is not found to be religious it would, of course, be subject to review under the applicable free speech standard.
See gnera//y Gitlowv. NewYork, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
See id. at 668-70; see also Beschle, supra note 89, at 135-37.
Even in areas such as hate speech, it can be convincingly argued that the
words themselves do not cause the harm. The harm, to the extent that these words
do cause a harm, is not caused by the words themselves, but by the painful knowledge these words can convey-knowledge that another views your race, gender,
ethnicity, or other characteristic as inferior to her own. The speech is merely evidence of these feelings and opinions. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech
and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. COMMENTAmR 71 (1996). Whatever the
merits of banning speech in other contexts, this Article is concerned with religious
speech. Thus, when I recommend a return to a pre-Gitow view of speech, I am
aware that this conflicts with certain secular restraints on speech that are currently
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Although this result may seem extreme in the case of someone
like Rahman, it is necessary to preserve the free and unfettered exercise of religious rights. If Rahman can be punished, so can a Protestant minister who, on April 14, advises a member of her congregation that it is morally wrong to pay income taxes to support federallyfunded hospitals that perform abortions. The minister is advocating
illegal action by complying with a tenet of her faith. To allow the
criminalization of religious speech such as this is to allow the state to
control the dissemination of religious beliefs and thus, practically,
the beliefs themselves.
Critics will say that this test affords religious speech a higher degree of protection than secular speech. It does. This "preferred"
status for religious speech, however, is merely a reflection of the preferred status given to religious speech by the First Amendment.
Secular speech is protected by only one clause of the First Amendment. Religious speech is doubly protected and as such deserves a
higher level ofjudicial deference.2
Another probable criticism is that the test will allow religious
radicals to escape criminal liability merely by keeping their own
hands clean and allowing their followers to do the "dirty work." The
clever religious leader will exert her influence verbally to prod others
to commit crimes and will use the protection of the First Amendment to escape punishment2 5 The problem of camouflaged incitepolitically popular. The "correctness" of such laws in a secular context is, however,
a subject for another Article and another author.
In addition to the special constitutional status of religion, there are other reasons to give religious speech higher constitutional scrutiny. For example, religious
speech is often full of imagery and metaphor that may be difficult, if not impossible,
to interpret in any temporal sense. For several examples of such imagery in various
sacred texts, see Grinstein, supra note 148, at 1370-74. Further, international law
recognizes a concept of natural law, or jus cogens, under which persons may be permitted to deviate from state laws that violate principles of a higher, natural law. Although this principle is not without debate in international law circles, such discussion is outside the scope of this article. For further information on the sources of
international law and the various schools of thought on the origins of international
law, see WL.LAm R. SLOMANSON, FuNDAMENrAL PERSpEcTrES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
8-9 (2d ed. 1995).
Some religious "leaders" already use this strategy. For example, David
Trosch, a defrocked Catholic priest, has publicly supported the killing of abortion
providers. Along with Paul Hill, Trosch has signed a declaration praising the murder of abortion providers as "justifiable homicide." One week before Paul Hill
killed a doctor and an escort in Florida, Trosch sent a letter to 1000 followers, stating that the time would come when 'we will see the beginning of massive killings of
abortionists and their staffs." NationalEditorialRound-Up: Death Penalty Would Make
HiUaMartyr,ABORION REI'. (American Political Network), Nov. 11, 1994. Despite
Trosch's "fiery sermons," Trosch, unlike Rahman, has not been prosecuted for his
advocacy of illegal acts.
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ment, however, is not limited to this test; it is also a problem under
the established Brandemburgtest.' If we accept this criticism as a reason to throw out the test, we must also be prepared to throw out
Brandenburg.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current free exercise jurisprudence provides little, if any, protection for religious exercises that transcend the realm of pure belief. Certain religious speech today is viewed as threatening to secular order; consequently, the lack of protection is particularly
troubling for those supporting broad religious liberty. It is important to remember that most mainstream religions can point to leaders who were once considered radicals' threatening the secular
authority. Given the fluctuations of religious beliefs, "devils" such as
Rahman must be given the benefit of the law so that the rest of us
will have refuge from the storms of changing political and religious
norms to pursue and testify to our own particular beliefs.

See genera//y Crump, supranote 163.

